

11.2.1 Games

11 January 1961

[illegible]

7. All in all, there were sufficient doubtful elements in this story to warrant further checking on it. However, in view of the danger of compromising [] we did not feel free to do anything about it until [] gave us substantially the same information on 8 December 1960 (Reference 1). During our meeting with Klaus Schmetz on 9 December 1960, we asked him what Brandt's reaction had been to the reported meeting with Globke. Schmetz answered with a blank stare. We then after telling him that the matter was apparently being held very closely by all concerned, gave him the bare outline of what was reported to have transpired at the meeting. Schmetz said he had never heard of this meeting and expressed a doubt that it could have taken place without coming to his attention (or at least to the attention of Senator Klein, whom he had seen several times since the alleged meeting and who would normally have told him about it but had not done so). We told Schmetz that we would look into it further but that it would be helpful, if he were to make some discreet inquiries in the meantime. Schmetz agreed to do so during his visit in Berlin, which was coming week-end (Brandt himself did not be asked at that point, because he had in the meantime gone on his vacation in the Luxembourg lands and was inaccessible). Schmetz returned to us upon his return from Berlin on 13 December 1960, at which time he informed us that he had been able to ascertain there had been no such meeting. He then told us that he had checked with the German Minister for West Berlin, Senator Klein, and with Horst W. Frank, Secretary of State, Chief of the State Chancellery, who knew both Brandt and Schmetz. On the basis of the evidence, we had a brief discussion with Globke during the evening of 14 December 1960, at which time he stated that he now had considerable doubts as to whether or not a meeting had taken place at all. We asked him to

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He again what he had heard of the matter. [] reported previous advice. We then asked him about the channel via which the information had become available to him and the SPD. He did not mention any name but his description left no doubt (a) that the sourcing cited in the [] report (Reference C) was correct (i.e., Foreign Office official to Saenger to Ollenhauer) and (b) that [] had received the information directly from Saenger (thereby eliminating the possibility, however tenuous it had to be to begin with, that [] had fabricated the report). We then told [] that the whole matter gave us considerable concern, because (a) Ollenhauer, believing that such a meeting took place, no doubt resented the fact that Brandt had failed to brief him thereon, which, in turn, could only be harmful to the already somewhat strained Ollenhauer-Brandt relationship, and (b) there was now on record with the top SPD leadership a report concerning U.S. foreign policy (even if, at least, Adenauer's interpretation thereof) which badly misrepresented the U.S. position. Consequently, if the Globke-Brandt meeting did not take place, we were most desirous of proving this to everyone's satisfaction. We then asked [] for his recommendations. [] stated that we either could go directly to Ollenhauer, tell him we had heard of the report from [] express to him our doubts that the meeting took place at all, and leave it to Ollenhauer's initiative to clear the air with Brandt, if we thought that necessary, or that we should contact our friends in Brandt's office in Berlin and ask them to make sure that Brandt clear the air. He recommended that we follow the latter course. We followed his advice and recontacted Klaus Schuetz during the afternoon of 14 December 1960. He told him that insofar as we could ascertain Ollenhauer continued to be under the impression that a Globke-Brandt meeting had taken place and that for the reasons we gave [] we were anxious to get to the bottom of the matter. To make sure that he understood that we were not acting on the basis of a wild rumor floating around the lower level of functionaries in the SPD "Barracks", we told him in confidence that we had received the information about the reported Globke-Brandt meeting from [] and we also described for Schuetz the sterile sourcing which [] had given us. Schuetz said that he also was anxious to obtain a final clarification but that he wanted to check it out with Brandt directly in view of the slight possibility that the meeting had taken place and that Brandt, because of his badly overburdened schedule (electioneering in the Saar, a number of important meetings, and trying to get away on his vacation), had failed to inform Ollenhauer of the meeting. Schuetz advised that he would be visiting Brandt that week-end and that he would ask him. Schuetz phoned us after his return to Bonn on 20 December 1960 and advised that Brandt had told him categorically that the alleged meeting with Globke did not take place. This, then, put us in a position to send Reference A.

It will probably prove impossible to ascertain just what kind of game was being played here and who was actually responsible for it. However, since the reasoning behind the Foreign Office official's action vis-a-vis Saenger seems altogether implausible (see the fourth point in Paragraph 2 above) and since it would appear to be even more implausible that the official had actually been directed to engage in this type of "political action", we are inclined to believe that Saenger may be the guilty party. If so, we have a new puzzle concerning his motivation in pulling off such a stunt.

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